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Abstract
There has been surprisingly little research to date on the supply-side role of food
manufacturers on equilibrium health outcomes for consumers. In this letter we con-
sider an oligopoly model in which food processors choose the health composition of
manufactured food. We show that price competition between food processors leads
to unhealthy food composition in the market equilibrium, even under circumstances
where consumers know the food content is unhealthy. Taxes on manufactured food
decrease the healthiness of manufactured foods whenever an improvement in consumer
health increases the price elasticity of food demand.
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1 Introduction
While considerable research has been conducted on the health implications of consumer
diet and exercise choices, the supply-side role of food processors in composing healthy food
items has been largely ignored in the literature. In this letter, we consider incentives for
food processors to influence equilibrium health outcomes through endogenous choices of
manufactured food composition.
Food processor decisions on manufactured food composition have essential consumer
health implications for several reasons. First, manufactured food represents a substantial
share of what consumers eat, comprising roughly 70 percent of the diet of U.S. consumers
(Warner 2013). Second, technological change has greatly enhanced the capability of food
processors to alter food composition, an activity that emerging evidence suggests is an im-
portant determinant of consumer health (Monteiro 2009, Moubarac et al. 2013). Third,
competitive forces in markets that drive food processors to minimize cost can greatly alter
market incentives for healthy food composition. For example, input substitution towards
partially hydrogenated oils reduces production cost (Unnevehr and Jagmanaite 2008), al-
lowing food processors engaging in these choices to achieve a lower price point. Such food
composition decisions can provide a competitive advantage to individual food processors
with adverse consequences for consumer health.
We frame our model of food composition choices by introducing consumers’ overall health
status as an argument of manufactured food demand. For example, fast food demand may de-
pend on doctors’ warnings on health outcomes. Consumer health outcomes, in turn, depend
both on the amount of food consumed and on the equilibrium composition of manufactured
food products.1 Given a large number of manufactured food products available for consump-
tion, consumer health outcomes are determined by the joint consumption of numerous food
products, which makes consumer health outcomes a common property resource.
1Consumer exercise choices, which are also important determinants of consumer health, are outside the
scope of the model.
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Indeed, food processors have long observed the common property aspect of consumer
health outcomes. In Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., McDonald’s argued that there was
no evidence that obesity-related health problems were caused by McDonald’s fast food, as
opposed to all the other manufactured foods consumers eat.2 In the U.S., for example, the
sixteen largest food processing firms in the U.S. together account for only 25% of U.S. calorie
consumption (Slining et al. 2013), making it difficult to pinpoint responsibility for consumer
health outcomes on a single firm.
When food composition decisions affect production costs, the incentive for healthy food
composition is influenced by the common property element of consumer health. When
selecting less costly food composition, an individual food processor receives the entire value
of the cost decrease, but shares the burden of the consumer health impact with all food
processors through the associated change in aggregate demand. For example, adding salt to
processed meats reduces cost (He and McGregor 2009), allowing an individual food processor
to capture rents by increasing the salt content of food; however, excessive salt consumption
can lead to high blood pressure reports from doctors, reducing consumer demand for all
processed meats at once.
In this letter, we clarify the implications of equilibrium food composition on consumer
health outcomes by considering the simplest possible model to capture the central trade-
off between individual rents and collective health outcomes. Specifically, we abstract from
product differentiation in the manufactured food sector and focus on incentives of food
processors to choose cost-reducing inputs in a homogeneous product environment.3
Our main findings on manufactured food composition are as follows. First, we show that
price competition between food processors leads firms to reduce cost by selecting unhealthy
2Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 22, 2003). Notably, McDonald’s defense
did not rest on their food being healthy; rather, they argued that if adding salt, sugar or other preservatives
alters food composition in an unhealthy way, then virtually all processed food is altered in a similar manner,
so that the health effect of consuming one product is indistinguishable from the health effect of consuming
any other (Mello et al. 2003).
3Allowing food composition choices to alter the palatabililty of individual products would not alter the
key results in the paper, but would provide additional modeling apperatus to sift through.
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food composition, even under circumstances where consumers are aware of the unhealthy
content of manufactured food. Moreover, this problem is compounded in highly-competitive
environments with a large number of food processors. Second, we demonstrate that taxes
on manufactured food decrease the equilibrium health composition of manufactured foods
whenever an improvement in the health status of consumers increases the price elasticity of
food demand.
2 The Model
Consumer utility in the model, U(Y,H), depends on manufactured food consumption, Y ,
and a measure of consumer health, H. Consumer health, in turn, depends on an index of
manufactured food, H(h1, ...hi, ...hn), where hi denotes the healthiness of the manufactured
food produced by food processor i and n is the number of firms. We interpret hi as any food
composition decision by food processor i that jointly affects the cost and the healthiness of
manufactured food.
A key element in our analysis of food composition is that the demand for all consumer
products depends on H(h1, ...hi, ...hn). This is the common property element of the model:
The health composition choice of firm i, hi, is mediated through the consumer market to affect
the demand facing all food processors.4 One interpretation is that consumers receive periodic
information on health, H, that revises demand for an entire category of manufactured food
products, for instance in response to a doctor’s warning.5
Consumer utility in our homogeneous product framework is U(Y,H) = U(
∑
i yi, H(h1, ...hi, ...hn)),
where yi is the output of firm i and Y =
∑
i yi. We assume utility is concave UY ≥ 0, UH ≥
0, UY Y ≤ 0, UHH ≤ 0, UY H ≥ 0.6
4Considerable evidence exists that the impact of food on health derives from the “whole diet”, rather
than from the consumption of any individual products (Kant 1996).
5For example, considerable evidence exists that consumers are uninformed of advised salt guidelines,
unclear about how much salt they consume, and unsure about the precise connection between high salt
intake and negative health impacts (Kenten et al. 2013, Newson et al. 2013). Similarly, in the case of
saturated fat consumption, Griffith and O’Connell (2010) show that even consumers who intend to buy
healthy foods or to manage their cholesterol do not appear to purchase a diet that is lower in saturated fat.
6Utility depends on manufactured food and an outside good, m. The utility function is additively sepa-
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To examine manufactured food composition, we allow individual food processors to choose
the healthiness of their products, hi. Healthier products are more expensive to produce,
which we specify with the cost function C(yi, hi) = c(hi).yi, for firm i, where c
′() ≥ 0 and
c′′() ≥ 0.7
Because we confine attention to a homogeneous product market, we abstract from all
forms of product differentiation, including nutritional labeling. Accordingly, market demand
for manufactured food depends only on the contribution of hi to H(h1, ...hi, ...hn). We show
below that qualitatively similar outcomes emerge in a differentiated product framework.
2.1 Social Provision
Given the cost function above, we consider without loss of generality the case of n = 1,
which results in the social planner’s problem:
max
{Y,h}
U(Y,H(h))− c(h)Y.
The social optimum is characterized by the first-order necessary conditions
UY − c(h) = 0, (1)
UH
Y
= c′(h). (2)
Note that we assume without loss of generality that ∂H
∂h
= 1.
At the social optimum, the quantity of manufactured food is selected to equate the
marginal benefit with the marginal cost of consumption in equation (1). The healthiness of
manufactured food is selected to align the marginal utility of health per unit of consumption
with the marginal cost of providing healthy food composition in equation (2). Let Y ∗ and
h∗ denote the socially optimal solution that solves equations (1) and (2).
rable, V = U() + m, and we normalize the price of m to unity.
7While it is clear that not all cost-reducing changes in food composition are also unhealthy changes in
food composition, our focus here is on the interesting case in which a trade-off exists in food processors’
choices of food composition between healthiness and cost.
4
2.2 Market Provision
Now consider food processors that compete in an n-firm Cournot oligopoly market. Inverse
demand for the manufactured food product is given by
P (
∑
i
yi, H(h1, ...hn)) = UY (Y,H),
and, given consumer demand, food processor i solves:
max
{yi,hi}
pii = [P (
∑
i
yi, H(h1, ...hn))− c(hi)]yi
Maximizing profit results in the following first order necessary conditions:
∂pii
∂yi
= P + yiPY − c(hi) = 0 (3)
∂pii
∂hi
=
[
PH
∂H
∂hi
− c′(hi)
]
yi = 0, (4)
where PY = UY Y and PH = UY H .
Expression (3) is the standard oligopoly pricing condition that marginal revenue equals
marginal cost. Expression (4) equates the marginal cost of healthiness with the marginal
contribution of healthiness to manufactured food demand. Food processor i’s choice of
food composition impacts demand for manufactured food according to the product of two
components: (i) the marginal valuation of health to consumers, PH ; and (ii) the contribution
of an individual processors’s choice of health composition to the consumer’s overall health,
∂H
∂hi
.
In the n-firm symmetric market equilibrium, yi = y = Y/n and hi = h, and it follows that
∂H
∂hi
= 1
n
.8 The private market equilibrium in the symmetric case is completely characterized
by
UY + yUY Y = c(h)⇔ UY − c(h)
UY
=
1
nε
,
8To show this result formally, consider the social welfare problem with n > 1. The socially-optimal health
level, h∗i , now solves UH
∂H
∂hi
− c′(h)yi = 0. In the symmetric equilibrium, y∗i = Y ∗/n and h∗i = h∗, it follows
immediately from inspection that ∂H∂hi =
1
n .
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1n
UY H = c
′(h),
where ε = −UY Y
UY Y
is the price elasticity of demand for manufactured food. The first condition
is the standard oligopoly condition that the Lerner index of market power equal to one over
the share-weighted elasticity of demand. When n is large, the quantity distortion in the
market equilibrium vanishes (conditional on health), and price approaches marginal cost in
the market equilibrium.
The second condition defines the private incentive to provide healthy manufactured food
composition. In the monopoly case (n = 1), a food processor would set the marginal cost of
health, c′(h), equal to the marginal valuation of health in consumer demand. Because the
social planner considers the marginal utility of health per unit of demand, UH/Y , rather
than the marginal value of health in demand, UY H , the equilibrium food composition under
monopoly embodies the familiar quality distortion first described by Spence (1975).
Oligopoly markets introduce novel effects on the health composition of manufactured
food. When n > 1, the individual food processor equates the marginal cost of healthy food
composition with the share-weighted marginal valuation of health in consumer demand,
1
n
UY H , de-emphasizing the effect of healthy food composition on consumer demand. That is,
each food processor fully internalizes the effect of unhealthy food composition on reducing
production cost, but fails to consider the impact of the resulting consumer health impact on
the profits of his n− 1 rivals.
It is clear by inspection that the problem of unhealthy food composition worsens with the
number of food processors in the market. Under perfect competition in the manufactured
food industry (n → ∞), food processors face strong market pressure to reduce cost, hi
accordingly tends to zero, and P c = c(0). In this case, the price of manufactured food
decreases below the socially optimal price, P ∗ = c(h∗) > P c, for all h∗ > 0. Manufactured
food becomes relatively inexpensive in the private market, not because scale economies and
technological change reduce the cost of processed food (as in Lakdawalla and Philipson 2009),
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but because aggressive price competition forces firms to decrease unit production costs by
selecting less healthy food composition.
Before turning to examine the effect of tax policy, it is helpful to verify that the outcomes
described here for the homogeneous product case are qualitatively similar to those which
would arise with differentiated products. With differentiated products, food processor i
faces demand given by P i(y1, ..., yn;H(h1, ..., hn)), where demand for product i depends on
individual product characteristics (e.g., flavor and taste) as well as on the health status of
consumers. Food processor i solves
max
{yi,hi}
pii = [P
i(y1, ...yi, ...yn;H(h1, ...hn))− c(hi)]yi,
which results in the first-order condition for health of
P iH
∂H
∂hi
= c′(hi).
With differentiated products, ∂H
∂hi
> 0 no longer need equal 1/n. Nevertheless, as in the
homogeneous product case, each food processor ignores the impact of his food composi-
tion choice on the demand facing rival food processors when choosing health composition.
Specifically, individual food processors consider only the effect of healthy food composition
on their own demand, P iH
∂H
∂hi
, while a social planner would consider the impact of healthy
food composition on the demand for all manufactured food products,
(
P iH +
∑
j 6=i P
j
H
)
∂H
∂hi
.
Thus, a qualitatively similar outcome emerges in the differentiated products case whenever
the choice of firm i to provide healthier food composition increases the demand for rival food
products,
∑
j 6=i P
j
H > 0.
3 Tax Policy
In this section we consider the implications of tax policy for manufactured food composition.
Our model is comprised of two distortions in the private market equilibrium: (i) firms have
insufficient incentives for healthy food composition; and (ii) firms restrict output to increase
price-cost margins. In general, policies that attain a socially optimal resource allocation
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require the use of two instruments, for instance a minimum quality standard on healthiness,
h ≥ h∗, combined with a subsidy on output to align yc with y∗.9 Nevertheless, given
the large number of nutrients that contribute to consumer health outcomes, and the wide
variety of food composition choices available to food processors, such policies are likely to
be impractical.
An important food policy that is often considered to improve consumer health is a tax
on manufactured food. For example, several countries have levied taxes on sugar-sweetened
beverages.
Let t denote a unit tax on manufactured food. The first order conditions in the symmetric
market equilibrium are:
P +
Y PY
n
− c(h)− t = 0, (5)
1
n
PH − c′(h) = 0. (6)
To characterize the implications of the tax on manufactured food output, prices, and health
composition, we impose the standard oligopoly stability condition (Vives 2001)
$ ≡ PY + yPY Y < 0,
and differentiate equations (5) and (6) to get[
PY + n$
(
n−1
n
)
PH + yPY H
PY H
1
n
PHH − c′′
] [
∂y
∂h
]
=
[
1
0
]
∂t,
where we have substituted terms from equation (6). Letting ∆ > 0 denote the determinant
of the coefficient matrix, the effect of the tax on manufactured food output and health
composition is
∂y
∂t
=
1
∆
(
1
n
PHH − c′′
)
< 0,
∂h
∂t
=
−PY H
∆
≶ 0.
9There have been some attempts to implement minimum quality standards for specific nutrients in prod-
ucts, for instance salt in the UK and trans fatty acids in the US.
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Taxes on manufactured food have the intended effect of reducing manufactured food
consumption, but have an ambiguous effect on food composition. Specifically, when an
increase in consumer health raises the price elasticity of food demand, PY H > 0, that is when
healthier consumers respond to lower food prices with larger increases in food consumption
than unhealthy consumers, taxes on manufactured food result in a decrease in the health
composition of manufactured food. The reason is that food taxes decrease the total quantity
of manufactured food produced by firms, reducing the marginal benefit of providing healthier
food composition in equation (6) when PY H > 0.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined market incentives for the health composition of manufactured
food. Our findings have several implications for food policy. First, supply-side policies such
as minimum quality standards and taxes on product attributes (e.g., fat, sugar, energy
density) need to account for endogenous responses in equilibrium food composition. As
Cawley (2015) observes, there is no specific subset of foods that cause health problems in
consumers, so that proposed taxes on energy-dense foods run the risk that consumers switch
to untaxed, energy-dense items (Chouinard et al. 2007; Fletcher et al. 2010, 2013; Zhen
et al. 2014). Our model reveals that food processors have market incentives to modify the
composition of manufactured food products in response to taxes.
Second, to the extent that consumer health outcomes are determined by supply-side
decisions on food composition, food policies are likely to alter both the quantity and quality
of manufactured food. For example, a tax on manufactured food that raises manufactured
food prices can create a trade-off in consumer health implications between the beneficial effect
of shifting consumption from manufactured food towards healthier, untaxed food products,
and the adverse effect of reducing the health composition of manufactured food.
Third, our findings have empirical implications for assessing the consumer health im-
plications of food policy. Public policies such as taxes on unhealthy food products lead
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both to lower consumption of these products and to healthier composition of these products
whenever improved consumer health outcomes reduce the price elasticity of food demand,
whereas adverse implications emerge for the effect of taxes on the health composition of food
whenever improved consumer health outcomes increase the price elasticity of food demand.
An interesting extension of our research would be to consider food policies that target
sequential stages of production and distribution of manufactured foods. Food policy in
a manufactured food sector can be levied at both the manufacturing and retailing levels
of the food system, which can provide potentially interesting incentives for healthy food
composition. For example, while individual food processors produce only a small share of
the manufactured food in consumers’ diets (Slining et al. 2013), supermarkets sell virtually
all manufactured foods. An interesting extension to our model would be to examine the
role for supermarkets to internalize health effects of consumers at the shopping-basket level
though food policy levied at sequential manufacturing and retail stages of the food system.
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